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As the 20th Century dawned, there were radical divergences in the policies individual
nations pursued towardrestraints ofcompetition by cartels and monopolies. Since World
War IT there has been considerable convergence as an increasing large number ofnations
have adopted explicit pro-competition policies. This paper traces the reasons for the
divergence and then convergence and asks what important steps remain to be taken,
especially where the concerns of international trade policy and competition policy
intersect. A proposed augmentation ofthe World Trade Organization's functions to deal
with competition policy issues is examined.
• NOG lecture at the WIFO conference on Global Issues in Competition Policy, Wien, June 21,
1996.1 Introduction
During the last half century, there has been a remarkable convergence in competition
policies among the nation state members ofthe world community. Scores ofnations have
moved from having no pro-competition laws, or even laws that favored monopoly, to
r presumptions against collusive agreements and the exploitation of dominant market
positions. The world economy has also become much more open. illcreasing fractions of
nations' gross domestic product originate through international trade, and multinational
enterprises have greatly increased their overseas presence through foreign direct
investment.
With international trade and investment flows determining to an increasing extent the
character ofcompetition within nations, it becomes increasingly important to review how
the rules governing cross-border competition will be determined. Does the enforcement
ofcompetition law within one's own boundaries suffice? Or should national policies be
extended extraterritorially to reachforeign business enterprises' conduct? Orshould there
be steps to harmonize the competition policies ofindividual nations, and perhaps even to
create supra-national institutions, coordinating and facilitating the exercise ofcompetition
policies across multiple nationaljurisdictions?
These are the broad issues addressed in this paper.1 I begin with an historical overview
of the competition policy convergence process, examining inter alia the reasons why
convergence occurred. I then identify the trans-national problems left unsolved by the
evolution ofnational institutions and consider, without resolving the most thorny disputed
issues, the main alternatives for further development.
2 Divergence and Convergence
To study convergence, one must begin with the extremes from which convergence took
place. The policies toward competition that emerged during the second Industrial
Revolution, i.e., from about 1870 to 1915, provide a fascinating subject in the intellectual
history·ofboth economics and economic policy.
The closing decades of the 19th Century brought dramatic changes in the character of
industrial competition. Improvements in transportation, notably, railroads and iron-hulled
ships propelled. by increa~ingly efficient steam engines, reduced the costs ofgeographic
market interpenetration, both within and across national borders. ill the manufacturing
and extractive industries, there were also many dramatic technological changes -- e.g., in
steel-making, petroleum extraction and refining, chemistry, and the electrification of
illumination and mechanical power. Improvements in communication - first the
telegraph and then the telephone -- facilitated the development of new managerial
I For a much more detailed exploration ofthese issues, see my monograph, Competition Policies
for an Integrated World Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution: 1994).structures able to control organizations of greatly increased scale and complexity.
Advances in technology and management in turn permitted industrial organizations to
/ grow to unprecepented size. As entrepreI).eurs sought the advantages, real or imagined,
oflarge scale, the quest for increased volume and geographic scope precipitated ferocious
price wars, prompting the formation of preventive cartels and (later, often through
mergers) market-dominating enterprises. Well before these developments became
unmistakable, Karl Marx prophesied Ita centralization of capital" under the "immanent
laws ofcapitalist production"2 "One capitalist always kills many," wrote Marx, leading to
"the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and
monopolize all advantages ofthis process oftransformation."
The unfolding changes in the structure and conductpfmodem industry were perceived by
economists in widely varying ways.3 Richard Ely, who chaired the 1886 organizational
meeting ofthe American Economic Association, and Alfred Marshall, England's leading
economist, believed that newly-emerging economies of scale required monopolistic
market structures only ip rare cases. A quite different view was taken by Robert
Liefmann, the leading German thinker on industrial economics at the close of the 19th
centwy:4
But since as a rule, a single seller is the cheapest... competition has the tendency,
when pushed to its limit, to destroy itselfand to be turned into monopoly. Since
the cheapest seller can often lower costs by producing the whole supply, it follows
that the maximum satisfaction ofwants is obtained when there is only one seller,
competition remaining latent in the background, effective only when the seller does
not employ the most efficient methods ofproduction, or when as a monopolist he
appropriates a profit much above the economic marginal return.
Liefmann believed that bitter price wars weeded out inefficient producers, leaving a
monopolist, who often then raised prices, triggering a flood ofentry and renewed price
wars. This, Liefinann concluded, was inefficient and macroeconomically destabilizing,
2 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (translated from the 3rd German edition by Samuel More and Edward
Aveling) (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 763.
3 This summary is abstracted from my edited collection, Monopoly and Competition Policy, vol. I
(Rants, UK: Edward Elgar, 1993), which pulls together representative analyses by leading
economists ofthe late 19th and early 20th centuries.
4 "Monopoly or Competition as the Basis of a Government Trust Policy," (translated by H. R.
Tosdal) Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 29 (1915), pp. 314-315; reprinted in Scherer,
Monopoly and Competition Policy, pp. 119-120. Liefmann's views appear to have had a
formative influence on the later writings of Joseph A. Schumpeter. See Erich W. Streissler,
"The Influence of German and Austrian Economics on Joseph A. Schumpeter," in Yuichi
Shionoya and Mark Perlman, eds., Schumpeter in the History ofIdeas (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 26-29.
2and so he argued for monopolization or cartelization, with prices regulated by a
government authority tb prevent entry-encouraging excesses. In the United States too,
many economists, and especially Arthur Hadley, later the president of Yale University,
saw competitive processes as naturally "cut-throat" and "ruinous." Others such as
Cornell University's Jeremiah Jenks, the most careful empirical analyst of industrial
structure and conduct at the turn ofthe centuIy and the principal advisor on competition
policy matters to Theodore Roosevelt, disagreed.
It is debatable whether Liefinann's views merely reflected the prevailing intellectual
sentiment in German-speaking Europe, or whether they actually shaped the policy
climate. The former is more likely true than the latter. Whatever the intellectual roots
were, Germany adopted, through judicial decisions and the inability ofthe Reichstag to
reach a consensus on alternatives, an expressly pro-cartel policy.s Under the freedom of
association accorded workers and businesses by German law, cartel agreements were
lawful and binding upon their participants except in cases of "actual monopoly" or
extreme exploitation ofconswners -- cases that never seemed to come to the authorities'
attention. Beginning with the Coalition Law of 1870, Austria pursued an essentially
similar policy, although without expressjudicial mechanisms to enforce cartel agreements
against recalcitrant participants.6
In the United States, a quite different tack was chosen. Economists held divergent views
concerning the benefits and costs ofthe newly emerging industrial practices and forms.
But there was widespread popu1ar concern over predatory practices and (when monopoly
power was consolidated) price-raising by "trusts" such as Standard Oil, the American
Sugar Refining Company, the American Tobacco Company, and National Cash Register.
In response to the popular outcry, Congress in 1890 passed the Sherman Antitrust Act,
declaring illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade." Also subjected to fines and injunction were
monopolization and attempts to monopolize. Scholars disagree over whether Congress
truly intended the Sherman Act to be a mandate for a tough anti-monopoly policy, or
merely a placebo to pacify public opinion. At first, the law was enforced only
lackadaisically. But tough, literal interpretations by the Supreme Court during the late
1890s made it clear that virtually all types ofhorizontal price-fixing agreements wou1d be
condemned, whether or not they successfully or unreasonably raised prices. And with the
accession ofTheodore Rposevelt to the U.S. presidency in 1901, government agencies
with an explicit competition-enhancement mission were created, and vigorous
S Scherer, Competition Policies, pp. 23-26.
6 Peter Poch, "Austrian Law/Commentary," in D. 1. Gijlstra, ed., Competition Law in Western
Europe and the USA, Supplement 66 (January 1986).
3enforcement began against market-dominating mergers and consolidations, leading to the
fragmentation inter alia ofStandard Oil, American Tobacco, and DuPont.'
Positions between the German and American extremes -- cartel-enforcing on one hand
and cartel-breaking on the other - were chosen elsewhere in the world. In England, the
leading industrialized nation of the 19th centwy, the Court of Appeals ruled in an
important 1889 decision that cartel agreements would not be enjoined except in cases of
manifold abuse, but that the courts would also not inteIVene, as German authorities did, to
enforce such agreements. As other European nations evolved their own solutions to the
problem, the predominant approach was to tolerate or even encourage the operation of
cartels except in rare cases ofabuse. Thus, at a conference ofthe Inter-ParliamentaIy
Union in 1930, the European participants unanimously adopted a resolution stating:8
Cartels, trusts and other analogous combines are natural phenomena ofeconomic
life towards which it is impossible to adopt an entirely negative attitude. Seeing,
however, that those combines may have a harmful effect both as regards public
interests and those ofthe State, it is necessary that they should be controlled. This
Control should not take the form ofan interference in economic life likely to affect
its normal development. It should simply seek to establish a supervision over
possible abuses and to prevent those abuses.
3 Convergence and Spread
The first significant step toward international convergence of competition policies
occurred in the wake of World War II. In both Japan and Germany, the occupying
powers, led by the United States, compelled the adoption ofnew competition ordinances
patterned to some extent after the American model. Prominent in those policies was the
structural divestiture ofpowerful industrial groupings -- in Japan, the divestiture ofcross-
holdings linking members ofthe Zaibatsu groups; in Germany, the breakup ofthe I.G.
Farben chemical giant into three main units (Bayer, BASF, and Hoechst) and dissolution
of the leading steel and coal syndicates. The 1947 German occupation authority law
authorizing these actions stated as its purpose "to destroy Germany's economic potential
to wage war" and to prevent Germany from "endangering the safety ofher neighbors.
119
7 The German Reichstag struggled inconclusively during. the late 1890s with the question ofwhat
to do about Standard Oil, which also dominated German illuminating oil markets. Fritz Blaich,
"'Der Standard-Oil-Fall' vor dem Reichstag," Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol.
126 (October 1970), pp. 662-682.
8 Reproduced in William Boserup and Uffe Schlichtkrull, "Alternative Approaches to the Control
of Competition," in John Perry Miller, ed., Competition Cartels and Their Regulation
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1962), p. 59.
9 Law No. 56, "Prohibition ofExcessive Concentration ofGerman Economic Power," by order of
the Military Government, December 2, 1947.
4In this there was a paradox: If one fragments giant business :finns and cartels to
undennine economic power, what does one do to enhance economic power? The
paradox was deepened when Allied authorities relaxed their structural reorganization
efforts in the hope ofstrengthening Germany and Japan as bulwarks against the Soviet
Union and Red Chinain the newly emerging cold war.
The paradox was recognized. In Japan, the Anti-Monopoly Law was viewed as a foreign
implant imposed "to suppress the economy of Japan so that it could not recover and
groW."IO After the occupation ended, enforcement ofthe law was characteristically weak,
although beginning in the late 1960s, in response to an emerging consumer movement,
'enforcement gradually became more vigorous. The German Federal Republic passed its
Law Against Restraints ofCompetition only in 1957, after seven years ofdeliberation.
The 1957 law contained at first no provisions to bar mergers or break up concentrations
ofeconomic power - key elements ofpostwar occupation authority competition policies.
However, it did authorize relatively strong anti-cartel measures, and after a slow start due
in part_to locating the Federal Cartel Office in Berlin but severely limiting its travel
budget, it was diligently enforced. A tough law was possible despite the bad taste left by
occupation authority mandates because the German government was strongly influenced
by Freiburg School liberals, who believed passionately in competitive free market
processes as the best alternative to dictatorship, and who saw cartels and monopolies as
impedim~nts to the attainment ofcompetitive market order (Marktordnung). Among the
most prominent members ofthe Freiburg school was Ludwig Erhard, economics minister
at the time the 1957 law was passed and later prime minister ofthe Federal Republic.
The United Kingdom began moving away from its laissez faire competition policy with
the establishment in 1948 ofa Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, which
at first had only information-gathering and advisory powers. An asserted (but disputed)
rationale for the change was fear that attaining postwar full employment objectives might
bejeopardized by the price-fixing practices ofcartels and monopolies.ll A more decisive
step occurred in 1956 when, spurred by a June 1955 Monopolies Commission report,
Parliament created a new Restrictive Practices Court with power to prohibit cartel
agreements that failed to navigate a set ofexemption "gateways." That a hard new line
would be taken was demonstrated in the first litigated price-fixing case.12 The Court
accepted as a defense the contention ofthe British Cotton Yam Spinners Association that
10 Hiroshi Iyori and Uesugi Akinori, The Antimonopoly Laws ofJapan (1983), p. vii.
11 See John Jewkes, "British Monopoly Policy 1944-56," Journal of Law & Economics, vol. I
(October 1958), p. 2, who attributes the post-war disposition to place greater reliance upon
competition to "those mysterious and unpredictable switches in broad economic thinking, so
numerous in history, in which irrationality has played at least as great a part as rationality."
Jewkes views the macroeconomic employment argument as "always dubious."
12 In re Yam Spinners' Agreement, L.R., 1 R.P. 118 (1959).
5theirs was a declining industry and that'painful pockets oflocalized unemployment would
result if their collusive activities were prohibited. But the Court held that whatever
employment benefits the Yam Spinners' agreement might yield were outweighed by the
harm from preserving inefficient and unnecessary spinning capacity.
A more decisive step toward convergence between the policies ofEurope and the United
States came with the creation ofthe EUropean Common Market in 1957. The main initial
purpose ofthe Treaty ofRome was to eliminate tariff barriers to trade among Common
Market member nations. As a true common market emerged, it was believed, anti-
dumping and similar trade regulation mechanisms could be phased out -- a step begun in
1970. But to ensure that trading relationships among member nations were not distorted,
an active competition policy was seen as a necessary substitute. As an EC official stated
at an early date in the Common Market's evolution: 13
It is ... beyond dispute -- and the authors ofthe Treaty were fully aware ofthis -
that it would be useless to bring down the trade barriers between the member
states ifthe governments orprivate industry were to remain free through economic
or fiscal legislation, through subsidies or cartel-like restrictions on competition,
virtually to undo the opening ofthe markets and to prevent, or at least unduly to
delay, the action needed to adapt them to the Common Market.
Enforcement of Treaty of Rome Article 85, deeming inconsistent with the common
market "all agreements between firms ... and all concerted practices likely to affect trade
between Member States," proceeded slowly at first. The first tough enforcement actions,
against quinine and synthetic dye cartels, came only in 1969. But after that, an
increasingly stringent enforcement program was sustained.
Extensions of Common Market law, especially the division of merger review
responsibilities between national and Community authorities, increased the compulsion
for each Common Market member to have its own national competition law.
Collaboration between European Economic Community and European Free Trade
Association nations engendered incentives for EFTA members to pass, or.strengthen,
their own competition laws. Austria's less tolerant Cartel Act of 1972 is said, for
example, to have resulted mainly from the agreement under which Austriajoined the EEC
in an extended free trade area. 14 The 1992 treaty creating a broader European Economic
Space stipulated inter alia that newcomers to the agreement would adopt competition
policies as strict as those within the European Community. As a result ofthis process,
which extended some semblance offree trade to much ofWestern Europe, nearly every
13 Statement of Hans von der Groeben in 1961, reproduced in U.S. Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, Antitrust Developments in the
European Common Market (USGPO: 1963), p. 96.
14 Poch, "Austrian Law/Commentary," p. 2.
6nation involved has come to enact competition laws with preswnptions of varying
severity against cartels, market-dominating mergers, and abuses of dominant market
positions.
Nor has the convergence process been confined to western Europe. Australia (which
passed but enforced only sporadically a competition law in 1906), New Zealand, the
Asian "Tiger" nations, many South and Central American nations, South Africa, and most
recently, fragments ofthe former Soviet bloc and Russia itselfhave seen fit to enact or
strengthen their owncompetition law variants.IS It would hardly be inaccurate to say that
no self-respecting nation can consider itself a full-fledged member of the world
community without laws proscribing to some extent cartels and abuses of monopoly
power.
4 Convergence: Fashion orTrue Religion?
On these developments a certain amount ofskepticism seems warranted. It is far from
clear that all of the nations enacting new competition laws in recent years have been
converted to a religious belief in unrestrained competition as the favored recipe for
conswner welfare and economic growth. Some of what has happened appears to be
window dressing -- an attempt to keep up with the Joneses without really effecting
significant changes in national economic policies. My own visits to two recently created
national competition policy offices (which to protect the innocent will not be identified)
revealed staffs uncertain as to what they should do, unable to obtain the information
needed to identify serious anti-competitive practices, and fearful that aggressive action
against powerful business interests could elicit prestige-eroding recriminations. In
economies still bearing substantial legacies from central planning, competition policy
office staffs have often exercised what powerthey possess not to foster unfettered market
processes, but to fetter them by imposing price controls.16 To be sure, new staffmembers
unsure ofhow to do theirjobhave not been deprived ofwell-intentioned advice. There is
a plenitude of visiting advisers (including myself) from nations with long-established
competition policy traditions, ready and willing to expound at length on the tricks oftheir
trade. It is difficult, however, to have a positive impact when one can't speak the
IS On Russia, see Paul L. Joskow, Richard Schmalensee, and Natalia Tsukanova, "Competition
Policy in Russia during and after Privatization," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:
Microeconomics (1994), pp. 301-381.
16 See Joskow et al. and, on similar earlier experience in West Germany, Erich Kaufer, "The
Control ofAbuse ofMarket Power by Market-Dominating Companies under the Gennan Law
against Restraints of Competition," Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staats-wissenschaft, vol. 136
(September 1980), pp. 510-532; and Ingo Schmidt, "Different Approaches and Problems in
Dealing with Control ofMarket Power: A Comparison on Gennan, European, and U.S. Policy
towards Market-Dominating Enterprises," Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 28 (Summer 1983), pp. 417-
460.
7language ofthe natives and has no understanding ofnational traditions, institutions, and
industrial structures.
It seems unlikely that pro-competition policies would be adopted so widely by nations
that have debated the alternatives seriously for decades if they did not offer solid,
compelling advantages. What established truths underlie the conversion implied by
convergence?
Perhaps the least important truth is the well-accepted proposition that resources are
allocated more efficiently to satisfy human wants under competition than under
monopoly. Proving this is economists' stock in trade. I assign it low importance because
most empirical analyses have found deviations from competition to impose quite small
allocative efficiency losses.17 Ignoring second-best perplexities and the offsetting benefits
ofproduct differentiation when high endogenously implied price elasticities are plugged
into welfare loss formulas, the estimates seldom reach five or ten percent of gross
domestic product, and typically they are much lower.
Much more important is the role vigorous competition plays in forcing business
organizations to run a tight ship, seek efficient scales of operation, adopt best-practice
technology, and innovate. Although we have known about potential X-inefficiency since
Adam Smith warned 220 years ago that "Monopoly is a great enemy to good
management,"18 we have only recently begun to accumulate systematic evidence on its
magnitude. James MacDonald has shown that significant productivity gains emerged in
u.S. industries subjected to new competitive shocks from imports, but only in industries
with relatively high domestic concentration ratios -- presumably, those in which
competition was blunted before imports forced behavioral changes. 19 From an unusually
ambitious program of comparative national case studies, Michael Porter and associates
found that strong enterprises able to hold their own in the rough-and-tumble of
international competition emerge through a kind ofnatural selection process under which
the contenders are repeatedly challenged by vigorous rivals.20 Similar conclusions
17 For a critical survey ofthe large literature, see F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin., 1980), pp. 661-667.
18 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNations (New York: Modem Library
edition, 1937), p. 147. '
19 James M. MacDonald, "Does Import Competition Force Efficient Competition?" Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 76 (November 1994), pp. 721-727. In a similar effort, I failed to
find significant import shock effects because I did not analyze the interaction between imports
and concentration. "Lagging Product-ivity Growth: Measurement, Technology, and Shock
Effects," Empirica, vol. 20, no. (1993), pp. 5-24.
20 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage ofNations (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 117-
124,594-598, and 662-673.
8emerged from a detailed comparative analysis ofproductivity levels in'Gennany, Japan,
and the United States.21 The "Costs ofNon-Europe" studies that provided intellectual
underpinning for the Europe 1992 initiatives similarly assigned much greater weight to the
role of competitive trade in undennining X-inefficiency than to allocative efficiency
considerations.22
One ofthe most frequent exceptions to pro-competitive presumptions in national laws has
been based upon a belief that cartels could cushion the shock of cyclical recessions.23
Theoretical guidance on this point is in fact ambiguous. On one hand, microeconomic
analysis teaches that ifprices are held up by a cartel during a recession, the quantity of
output demanded will be less than under downward-flexible competitive pricing, all else
equal, and profit-maximizing firms will therefore employ less labor, aggravating the
slump. Macroeconomic theory suggests that adverse Pigou effects from price rigidity will
also impair recovery. On the other hand,iffirms holding prices high through the exercise
ofmonopoly power fail to maximize profits, but instead utilize their managerial slack to
retain surplus labor, employment declines might be smaller during the slump, and
therefore the slump could be mitigated. I tested these conflicting hypotheses with respect
to the U.S. recessions of1954 and 1958 and found, as did other analysts, no support for
the "concentration leads to employment stability" version.24 Recognition by national
legislators that conventional wisdom concerning the stabilizing effects of cartels is of
doubtful validity may underlie in part the rejection oftraditional pro-cartel policies.25
21 Martin Baily and Hans Gersbach, "Efficiency in Manufacturing and the Nature ofCompetition,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microoeconomics (1995), pp. 307-358. Baily and
Gersbach do not analyze the construction industry, whose extremely low productivity in Japan
has been attributed to "the lack of competition [which] has spilled over from bureaucrats who
discourage productivity increases by fixing cost formulas for public works. This lack of
competition also allows firms to buy expensive domestic materials." Mark Tilton, Restrained
Trade: Cartels in Japan's Basic Materials Industries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p,
85.
22 Research on the "Costs ofNon-Europe" Basic Findings, two vols. (Luxembourg: Publications
Office ofthe European Communities, 1988).
\
23 See e.g. Poch, "Austrian La~/Commentary," p. 2, who observes that the Austrian Cartel Act of
1951 embodied the idea that "cartels could compensate for the economic cycles and stabilize the
markets. Therefore they could be economically useful ifnot indispensable."
24 F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand-
McNally, 1980), pp. 365-367. See also qty discussion on p. 364 ofthe effects ofcartelization
under the U.S. National Recovery Act during the 1930s.
25 On the destabilizing effects ofGerman cartels during the early decades ofthe 20th Century, see
Kurt Bloch, "On German Cartels," Journal ofBusiness ofthe University ofChicago, vol. 5 (July
1932), pp. 213-222. .
9Paralleling the view that cartels ease the pains of recession is the hypothesis that
chronically excess capacity can be shed more effectively through cartel agreements than
through competition. Although"down-sizing" is probably less painful, at least for
stockholders, under cartel auspices, there is now a considerable amount ofevidence that
competition tends to squeeze out first the least efficient producers, whereas internal cartel
politics require each company, efficient and inefficient, to shed proportionate amounts o(
capacity.26 Thus, the capacity left in operation tends to be less efficient on average under
cartelization than under competition.
Perhaps the most powerful impediment to the adoption of pro-competitive policies, at
least in Europe, has been the belief that only large, monopolistic firms can compete
effectively with overseas rivals, especially in high-technology fields. France's Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber expressed this view most eloquently:27
The first problem ofan industrial policy for Europe consists in choosing 50 to 100
firms which, once they are large enough, would be the most likely to become
world leaders ofmodem technology in their fields. At the moment we are simply
letting European industry be gradually destroyed by the superior power of
American corporations. Counterattack requires a strategy based on the systematic
reinforcement ofthose firms best able to strike back. Only a deliberate policy of
reinforcing ourstrongpoints -- what demagogues condemn under the vague term
of"monopolies" -- will allow us to escape relative underdevelopment.
France and other major European nations pursued such policies for nearly a quarter ofa
century with little discernible success. The toughening and spread of pro-competition
policies in part reflects recognition that national champions insulated from competition
seldom, ifever, become world-class competitors.
Finally, many ofthe world's citizens have hungered for freedoms long denied them by
dictatorial governments. IfGermany's Freiburg school is correct, governments are more
likely to refrain from intervening in market processes when there is assurance that the
markets are functioning reasonably competitively. The ease of entry that is a crucial
contributor to workable competition also implies more freedom ofeconomic opportunity
for individual citizens. Here too, however, there are paradoxes. Competition policies can
be oriented toward preserving competitive market processes or toward protecting
26 See e.g. R. W. Shaw and S. A. Shaw, "Excess Capacity and Rationalisation in the West
European Synthetic Fibers Industry," Journal ofIndustrial Economics, vol. 32 (December 1983),
pp. 149-166; M. 1. Peck, Richard C. Levin, and Akira Goto, "Picking Losers: Public Policy
Toward Declining Industries in Japan," in John B. Shoven, ed., Government Policy Toward
Industry in the United States and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.
195-239; and Tilton, Restrained Trade, pp. 46-47, 65, 94, and 200.
27 The American Challenge (translated by Ronald Steel from the 1967 original, Le Deft Americain)
(New York: Athenaeum, 1968), p. 159.
10individual competitors from the not-so-tender mercies ofaggressive rivals. The United
States has experienced repeated conflicts -- e.g., in merger, predatoI)' pricing, and other
price discrimination cases - over which ofthe two quite different objectives should be
dominant in its antitrust enforcement activities.
5 International Challenges and Opportunities
For whatever mixture of reasons, pro-competitive policies have spread to most of the
world's economically developed nations and to some ofthe less-developed nations. This
phenomenon coupled with the increase in world trade and foreign direct investment poses
new challenges. In particular, now that competition policies have taken root within
national borders and, within the ED, across boundaries, is there a need for harmonization
and/or coordination ofpolicies among nations?
Several loose ends have been left hanging in the wake of recent competition policy
deveLopments.28 For one, most nations (or in the case ofthe ED, trade blocs) discourage
cartels and monopoly abuses within their boundaries, but .exempt export cartels from
those prohibitions or even actively encourage the cartelization of export activities.
Second, for similar reasons, mergers to achieve monopoly power in export markets are
also encouraged. But third, because many mergers involve multi-national enterprises
operating ,throughout the world, the proliferation of laws requiring evaluation of a
merger's domestic consequences means that some mergers are subjected to duplicative
national reviews -- in the extreme case ofGillette's acquisition ofWilkinson Sword, to
fourteen such costly reviews. There is reason to believe also that national merger
decisions are biased against foreign enterprise attempts to take over domestic companies.
Fourth, when domestic monopolies and cartels are tolerated, e.g., because they have
justified their existence by sustaining impressive export campaigns,29 the ability to hold
prices high at home may facilitate and encourage dumping abroad. Dumping can distort
international trade flows and, if GATT-compatible retaliatory tariffs are imposed or
voluntary restraint agreements are negotiated, engender new trade distortions. Finally,
there is much disagreement among economists and national economic policy-makers over
the desirability ofvertical market restraints such as exclusive dealing agreements between
manufacturers and their retailers, exclusive territorial agreements, and resale price
maintenance agreements. To the extent that such vertical restraints are pennitted under
28 This is an excessively brief and superficial summary. My book, Competition Policies for an
Integrated World Economy, devotes a 45-page chapter to the subject.
29 As a majority ofthe U.S.' Supreme Court observed in 1920 when it absolved the United States
Steel Corporation from monopolization charges: "And what ofthe foreign trade that has been
developed and exists? ... We do not see how the Steel Corporation can be such a beneficial
instrumentality in the trade ofthe world, and its beneficence be preserved, and yet be such an
evil instrumentality in the trade ofthe United States that it must be destroyed.... [W]e do see in
[dissolution ofthe company] a material disturbance of, and it may be serious detriment to, the
foreign trade." United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U.S. 417,457 (1920).
IInational competition laws, they may serve to perpetuate distribution channels that inhibit
imported products' access to consumers, and hence distort international trade.30
There are several possible solutions to this set ofborder-spanning problems. One is for
nations (or the ED) to applytheirnational competition laws extraterritorially, reaching out
and levying penalties against restrictive practices abroad that have adverse effects in the
complaining nation's home market. This is most successfully done when the offending
foreign business enterprises have resident branch offices or subsidiaries whose
documents can be subpoenaed and assets that can be seizediffines are imposed. Such
exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction often anger the home governments of the
offending enterprises, but they have achieved a substantial measure ofacceptance, having
been pursued by the United States, the European Union,31 and Canada. The United
States has also engaged in "aggressive unilateralism" under Section 301 of its
international trade law, viewing as actionable distortions of trade import cartels and
vertical restraints that inhibit the access of U.S. goods to foreign markets. Claims that
U.S. automobile and auto parts exports were held back by exclusive dealing
arrangements between Japanese car manufacturers, their dealers, and repair shops, and
that Fujifihn's powerful exclusive wholesaler network retarded Kodak color film sales in
the Japanese market, are the most recent examples ofcompetition policy actions under
Section 301.32
A second possibility is the negotiation ofbilateral cooperation agreements, under which
national competition policy authorities collaborate in the collection of evidence and
perhaps also in enforcement actions against alleged restraints of competition that span
their home boundaries. The United States, for example, has entered into such agreements
with Gennany, Australia, Canada, and the European Community Commission. Needless
to say, the home country authorities of enterprises accused of restrictive practices are
likely to cooperate in such endeavors only when they find it in their national interest to do
SO.33
A third wayofattempting to contain the loose ends is to create a supra-national authority
withjurisdiction over defined restraints oftrade that span national borders. The first step
in this direction was taken at the United Nations Conference on Trade and EmplOYment
30 See F. M. Scherer, "Retail Distribution Channel Barriers to International Trade," forthcoming in
the proceedings ofa Columbia University School ofLaw conference on the Multilateral Trade
Regime in the 21st Century, held in November 1995.
31 E.g., in A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio et al. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1988
E.C.R. 5193 (1988).
32 See Scherer, "Retail Distribution Channel Barriers."
33 For examples ofnon-cooperation, see my paper, "International Trade and Competition Policy,"
presented at the international conference on Competition Policies for an Integrated World
Economy, Oslo, June 1996.
12in Havana, Cuba, in 1947 and 1948. Under the so-called Havana Charter, a new
International Trade Organization (ITO) would be created. Article 46 of the Charter
stated that:34
Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall cooperate with the [ITO]
to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business
practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to
markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful
effects on the expansionofproduction ortrade ...
The ITO was given a mandate to consult with member nations over alleged violations
(including price fixing, production quota agreements, spheres of influence agreements,
and the collusive suppression of technology), to urge corrective action, and to publish
compliance reports. Although U.S. officials had played a leading role in drafting the
Havana Charter, the United States Senate refused to ratify it because many senators
be~eved its provisions would infringe too much onU.S. sovereignty. As a result, onlythe
sections of the Charter that gave rise to the GATT organization were actually
implemented.
Subsequent attempts to reach international agreement on substantive codes for business
finns' competitive behavior in the world trading arena also came to naught when nation
states jeciIous of their sovereignty withheld their support. Meanwhile, however,
international trade grew by leaps and bounds. And in 1995, the Treaty ofMarrakech
(culminating the Uruguay Round oftrade negotiations) substantially broadened the rules
governing international trade and investment and created a World Trade Organization to
oversee their enforcement.
With these important steps taken, there has been renewed interest in moving forward
toward harmonization of competition policy rules among trading nations and the
designation of a supra-national organization (such as the WIG) to sustain coordination
and conflict resolution functions. Several proposals, including my own,35 have surfaced.
Since I understand best the rationale and pitfalls ofmy own proposal, I focus here onit.
Ifprogress is to occur, I believe, certain desiderata must be clearly acknowledged. These
are embodied in my proposal.
For one, despite convergence, there remain enonnous differences across nations in the
substance ofnational competition policies. Ifan agreement is to be reached, it will have
to be on some modest subset of core principles governing only transactions with
34 U.S. Department of State, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (March 24,
1948), p. 86.




fur We\tw\rtsCsignificant implications for international trade and/or investment. The most likely
candidates are export and import cartels, serious abuses of dominant positions in the
world market, and merger approvals, or at least, the paperwork processes underlying
mergerreviews.
Second, evenin these core areas, many nations will be unwilling to go all the wayto a flat
prohibition. Brazil is unlikely to surrender its (usually unsuccessful) right to orchestrate
an international coffee cartel, Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing nations their
participation (however dispirited oflate) in OPEC, Canada its right to control exports of
potash (in which it holds a position analogous to that ofOPEC) and uraniwn yellowcake,
Russia its cooperation with the de Beers diamond syndicate, and the United States the
dominance of Boeing in large turbojet airliner markets. Thus, exceptions will be
necessary. Under my proposal, each nation would be allowed three four-digit SITC
industry exceptions from a general ban on export cartels. As experience is gained, the
nwnberofexemptions might be progressively reduced to two and then one pernation.
Third, it must he recognized that historically, a consid-erable time interval passed before
national competition policy enforcement agencies learned how to do their work
effectively. Seven years elapsed between passage ofthe U.S. Sherman Act and the first
Supreme Court prohibition of a price-fixing ring; twelve years between the Treaty of
Rome and the first imposition offines against European Community cartels; eleven years
between the creation ofthe U.K. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission and
the first prohibition ofa cartel by the Restrictive Practices Court; and 20 years between
the post-occupation amendment of Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law and a Fair Trade
Commission attack on illegal cartels, including the Commission's first criminal price-
fixing indictmenP6 Before really serious enforcement can proceed, much learning and
the perhaps also the building ofpolitical support must occur. Therefore, I would have
any international body charged with competition policy responsibilities begin by
confining its activities to investigation and the publication ofreports on alleged border-
spanning restrictive practices. Only in the seventh year (perhaps too few) ofits existence
would I have the agency undertake enforcement activities.
Finally, even after a considerable shakedown period, an international competition policy
agency would have to tread warily, according considerable respect to national
sovereignty. It would use the good offices ofnational competition authorities to support
its investigations, and it would entrust national authorities with implementing
recommended corrective actions. Only in cases of national intransigence would
conventional WTO enforcementmechanisms be setin motion.
36 Tilton, Restrained Trade, pp. 33-35.
14Despite the timidity ofmy proposals, it is questionable whether the community ofnations
would accept my proposed expansions ofthe WTO's mission.37 My home nation, the
United States, is likely to be at best a reluctant partner. Jealous of their own
predominance in competitipn policymatters, the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have
opposed internationalization proposals, preferring negotiated bilateral arrangements in
which they playa leading role. Ratification ofthe Uruguay Round treaty by the United
States Senate was a close call, achieved in part by the Administration's acceptance of
provisions requiring a panel ofU.S. judges to review WTO decisions contraIy to U.S.
positions and determine whether they were correctly decided. Ifwithin the first five years
of the WTO's operation three of the decisions reviewed in this way are deemed
unjustified, a mechanism will be set in motion under which Congress reassesses whether
the United States should remain a WTO member. In other words, the United States has
left a Sword ofDamocles hanging over its participation in an already ratified institution.
When a would-be legislative draftsman cannot deliver the votes from his home
constituency, he has little claim to leadership in the game of statesmanship. Perhaps
therefore I should yield the forum to others with more solid mandates. Perhaps too one
must accept a conclusion that the world is not yet ready for steps harmonizing
competition policies across borders. What seems clear, however, is that the problems,
and hence the pressures for new solutions, will not go away.
37 When I presented these proposals at a Washington conference in March 1995, Judge Diane
~ Wood commented that the world would adopt Esperanto as a universal language before it
accepted a competition policy innovation like mine. Three days later I found myselfin a Munich
hotel watching a German television interview with the Common Market's chief translator. He
observed that with the accession ofever more nations (and bilateral language combinations) to
the Union, his task was becoming impossibly difficult, perhaps solvable only by the adoption of
Esperanto.
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